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“Green” or “Red”? Reframing the 
Environmental Discourse in Nigeria 
Akin Iwilade 
Abstract: This paper investigates the role of environmental social move-
ments and NGOs in the struggle for democracy in Nigeria. In particular, it 
examines how environmental issues, specifically in the oil-rich Niger Delta, 
have come to symbolise the Niger Delta communities’ craving for greater 
inclusion in the political process. The paper argues that because of linkages 
to the nature of economic production, environmental crises have been par-
ticularly useful in driving the democracy discourse in Nigeria. By linking 
environmental crisis to democratisation and the interactions of power within 
the Nigerian federation, NGOs and social movements have been able to 
gain support for environmental causes. This may, however, have dire impli-
cations for the environmental movement in Nigeria. Because ownership, not 
necessarily sustainability, is the central theme of such discourse on resource 
extraction, social movements may not be framing the environmental dis-
course in a way that highlights its unique relevance. The paper concludes by 
making a case for alternative methods of framing the environmental dis-
course in a developing-world context like that of Nigeria. 
  Manuscript received 11 June 2012; accepted 16 July 2012 
Keywords: Nigeria, political associations/groupings, ecological movements 
Akin Iwilade is an Eni Scholar at St. Antony’s College, University of Ox-
ford. 
  
  158 Akin Iwilade   
 
This paper enquires into the internal logic of the environmental movement 
in Nigeria within the particular contexts of resource scarcity, resource rights, 
economic crisis and political exclusion. It examines the appropriation of 
environmental discourses by civil society movements involved in what are, 
fundamentally, struggles for democratic incorporation within the highly 
volatile and resource-rich Niger Delta region. This enquiry is particularly 
important because it draws attention to the implications of a growing hyper-
connectivity of the various discourses, mutually reinforcing as they may 
sometimes be, for the continued public awareness of the environmental 
crisis in the Niger Delta.  
The paper addresses this in three interconnected sections: The first at-
tempts to deconstruct the intersections between environment (crisis and 
governance), resources and democracy. This section provides a framework 
within which the analysis of the environmental movement and the Niger 
Delta struggle can be understood. The second section examines the nature 
of social groups involved in the environmental movement in Nigeria and 
raises the question of their specific colouration: Are they fundamentally 
“green” or “red”? “Green” is taken to mean “environmentally focused”, 
while “red” refers to “resource focused”. The concluding section suggests 
ways of reframing the environmental discourse to redirect its focus toward 
ecological and sustainability issues rather than merely serving as a conven-
ient front for resource control and accumulation battles.  
Environment, Resource and Democracy: 
Deconstructing the Intersections 
In relation to the on-going struggle in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, it is 
possible to discern the intersections between environmental crisis and the 
democratic struggles for incorporation and for access to the revenue that 
accrues from the exploitation of oil.  We can also recognise the appropria-
tion of environmental rhetoric by organisations whose prime purpose is to 
defend resource rights and secure access to state patronage and resources 
rather than to promote sustainability. 
To start with, it should be noted that the increasing liberalisation of the 
political space in Africa since the early 1990s has unleashed a flood of Afro-
optimism. The literature is replete with notions of the growing institutionali-
sation of political power (Posner and Young 2007), of a supposed demo-
cratic rebirth (Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein 2010), and of the ability of civil 
society to extract democratic accountability from the state and thus deepen 
democracy (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Warren 2001). This tendency to 
view changes in the political space – which incidentally often amount to 




“incomplete and tenuous shifts toward more representative government” 
(Walker: 1999: 260) – as progress is an articulation of the liberal triumphal-
ism that seized the world at the end of the Cold War. The problem, how-
ever, is that these marginal changes provide few to no answers to many of 
the questions that still plague Africa’s democracies. In fact, much of the 
literature that celebrates these political transitions as “change” offers little 
insight into the actual depth of Africa’s democratic experiences. These 
studies also do not adequately take into account the specific nature of Af-
rica’s democracy, so brilliantly described by Ake (1993).  
Perceiving democracy, at least its liberal variant, as a cure for Africa’s 
problems supports the tendency to see a link between democratic govern-
ance and the environment. But the specific details of the relationship be-
tween democracy and qualitative environmental governance are rarely dis-
cussed, and the contradictions between the neoliberal logic of resource ex-
traction that underpins the liberalisation projects in many African states and 
the issue of ecological sustainability have also generally been neglected. The 
link between democracy and the environment, according to Walker (1999), 
has four key components:  
 The first is an erroneous assumption that democratisation constitutes 
democracy. As Walker (1999: 264) rightly points out, there are of 
course theoretical grounds to argue for a correlation between democ-
racy and sound environmental management. Democratisation, how-
ever, is a different ball game. A democratic state will have effectively in-
stitutionalised accountability (social, political and economic) and par-
ticipation beyond elections. This is clearly not the case with most Afri-
can states, as many scholars have pointed out (Adejumobi 2000; 
Momoh 2006). Democratisation, on the other hand, is rooted in con-
tradictions and serious inconsistencies. For most African states, democ-
ratisation remains an arena of competition between forces of the ancien 
regime – who seek to maintain the autocratic status quo – and those with 
democratic ambitions. These battles allow for practices that ignore en-
vironmental rights and the sustainability imperative.  
 The second component is the perception that in countries where citi-
zens can hold leaders accountable, they are in a better position to insist 
on environmental policies and practices. This line of thinking suggests 
that a democratic – or democratising – state will provide opportunities 
for local communities to resist unsustainable environmental practices 
and to also encourage the state to seek its citizens’ cooperation in de-
termining what qualifies as acceptable practice.  
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 The third component is a corollary to this and it relates to the extent to 
which democracy promotes greater responsiveness of political leaders 
to the needs of their constituencies. The logic is that since democracy 
guarantees this sort of accountability, political leaders will discern the 
natural desire for environmental sustainability and thus design govern-
ance responses that guarantee it.  
 Fourth, it is assumed by many scholars and policymakers that democ-
racy can be linked to the environment because this kind of govern-
mental system is most likely to allow greater local participation in envi-
ronmental decision-making and management. 
The broad outlines of this democracy–environment linkage appear strong 
theoretically. However, an examination of evidence on the ground in areas like 
the Niger Delta tells a completely different story. Since the return to active 
democratisation in 1999, little has changed in the way the environment is 
treated by the coalition of the state and multinational corporations that ex-
ploits oil in the region. The local communities have not experienced signifi-
cantly higher levels of participation in environmental management, nor have 
their livelihoods ceased to be undermined by oil exploration and exploitation. 
In spite of the return to civilian rule in 1999, scholars have been pointing to 
the fact that the area has not fared any better since then (Obi 2001; Okonta 
2008). This raises questions about the validity of democracy’s perceived posi-
tive correlation with sound environmental management. 
One may even go beyond the available empirical evidence to raise valid 
theoretical questions about the perceived positive correlation of democrati-
sation to environmental sustainability. For instance, at the core of the neolib-
eral project that drives the on-going democracy movement in Nigeria is the 
privileging of multinational capital. In this setting, the accumulation of capital 
and the maximisation of profits are by far the most important elements of 
investment. Thus, it is hard to imagine the multinational oil companies delib-
erately engaging routinely in sustainability practices that would greatly reduce 
their profits. A positive intersection between the environment, resources and 
democracy thus cannot be taken at face value. To justify such assumptions, a 
lot more empirical evidence will have to be generated. 
NGOs, Social Movements and the Environmental 
Movement in Nigeria: Green or Red? 
One of the most well-known environmental groups in Nigeria is the Move-
ment for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Its leader, Ken Saro 
Wiwa, was murdered in 1995 by the Sani Abacha-led military junta. Saro 




Wiwa was the winner of many prestigious environmental prizes, including 
the Right Livelihood Award, the Goldman Award and the Hellman/Ham-
mett Award. MOSOP was not the first social movement to challenge the 
Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies operating in the Niger 
Delta. However, the Ogoni case, as MOSOP framed it, is significant because 
it generated immense international interest and effectively placed the crisis 
in the region at the centre of the environmental discourse. Even though 
Saro Wiwa is best remembered as an environmental rights activist, he noted 
the politicisation of the environmental message of MOSOP. In an interview 
with Chris McGreal, Saro Wiwa noted the implications of this change:  
We have been fighting for the environment for a long time, nobody 
listened because the environment was not a serious issue with anybody 
except for those of us who were suffering. But when we made a politi-
cal case, then that began to draw some attention (The Guardian 1993: 8).  
This does not, however, capture the complete picture. The order of his 
comments about the role of politics and environment in the Ogoni struggle 
should have been reversed. For instance, the Ogoni Bill of Rights, which 
predates the statement quoted above and is arguably the most important 
document clearly stating the aims of the Ogoni in their struggles against the 
state and the multinational oil companies, did not mention the environment 
until Article 16 (OBR 1990). In its demands, environmental issues were also 
mentioned last. Issues like language, inclusion in the political process, and 
economic development clearly ranked higher on the Ogoni list of priorities. 
This is rather curious for an organisation that has been touted as “environ-
mental”.  
There is no doubt that the Ogoni struggle brought the environmental 
crisis in the Niger Delta to a global audience and forced many countries to 
re-examine their political relationship with Nigeria in the 1990s. However, 
its effectiveness in linking the environmental question to the issues of politi-
cal marginalisation and economic development (particularly resource rights 
and control) effectively elevated the political and economic dimension of the 
governance crisis way above the ecological. Eventually, the lesson that suc-
cessor organisations of the Niger Delta struggle learnt from MOSOP was 
“resource control” and not management or sustainability. The Ogoni exam-
ple is instructive because of the demonstrative effect it had on other similar 
movements that emerged with the return to civil rule in 1999.  
It should be noted that at the end of the “Ogoni decade” in the Niger 
Delta conflict, a decisive shift away from the ecological questions in the 
region occurred. Organisations that succeeded MOSOP at the frontlines of 
the oil communities’ battles against the state–multinational coalition have 
pushed environmental debates to the side. Groups like the Movement for 
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the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta People’s 
Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) have all but 
ended the oil communities’ romance with the green movement and appear 
to now increasingly focus on the central questions of resource control rather 
than resource sustainability – they seek to achieve a greater share of oil re-
sources rather than a protected environment. In an interview in 2004, Asari 
Dokubo, leader of the NDPVF, was asked what exactly they were fighting 
for. His answer leaves little doubt as to the centrality of the red rather than 
the green questions of the Niger Delta crisis. He stated that the struggle, 
among other things,  
has something to do with our Ijawness. The Nigerian state is stealing 
from us, we say no more stealing of our resources. Give it back to us. 
Our language and our culture which the Nigerian constitution has du-
biously eliminated and said that it is Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba [...] that will 
be taught our children, we say no, we want to speak our Ijaw lan-
guage, exhibit our culture (Newswatch 2004: 13). 
Throughout the interview, Asari Dokubo made no reference whatsoever to 
the environmental crisis in the Niger Delta. While this trend cannot, of 
course, be solely linked to the impact of MOSOP’s creative use of issue 
linkages in its challenge of state authority, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
opening up of the political space has induced the Niger Delta communities 
to more boldly place the real drivers of their protests (economic crisis and 
political exclusion) at the forefront of the discourse. A content analysis of 
other interviews by leaders of the various movements involved in the Niger 
Delta struggle reflects similar sentiments. A few examples will suffice to 
illustrate this point:  
I know that my group, the NDPVF, is not a militant organisation. It 
is a broad-based Ijaw and Niger Delta organisation fighting for the 
actualisation of the sovereignty and the right of the people to their 
sovereignty (Asari Dokubo, Newswatch 2007: 29).  
There is a consensus that the crisis in the Niger Delta is a cumulative 
consequence of five major factors. These are the challenge of minor-
ity rights in a multi-ethnic country; history of poor or bad govern-
ment; the lure of crude-oil-stealing; the challenge of a principle-based 
nation-building with regard to fiscal federalism; and the criminalisa-
tion of politics (David Dafinone, The Week 2008: 6).  
All foreign multinationals who have been involved in the criminal ex-
ploitation of the Niger Delta protected territory in collaboration with 
imperialist Britain and the dubious Nigerian state […] immediately 
compute the equivalent of the resources illegally exploited and stolen 




from the Niger Delta […] in dollars, euros and other international 
currencies (Cynthia Whyte of Martyrs Brigade (MEND), Newswatch 
2006: 14). 
The above statements were made by stakeholders in the Niger Delta struggle 
between 2000 and 2009. They generally reflect the peculiar priorities of the 
organisations involved in the battle against the state–multinational oil coali-
tion in the region. The implication is that ecological issues are generally no 
longer referred to in their own right within the discourse on the crisis in the 
Niger Delta except to the extent that they relate to the broader questions of 
governance, economy, democratisation and security. 
Of course, there are still NGOs focused on the environmental govern-
ance issues facing the region. Organisations like the Environmental Rights 
Action (ERA) and Friends of the Earth (FoE) are still very much focused on 
the ecological devastation. These movements can, and do, complement the 
social movements mentioned above. However, the Niger Delta discourse has 
become fixated on the economic and political questions facing the region. The 
response of the Nigerian state has also inevitably been centred around 
providing oil-producing communities with a greater share of the economic 
resources accruing from oil. The government has also made efforts to en-
courage both greater inclusion of oil-producing minorities in the political 
process at the federal level and the gradual demilitarisation of the region. 
These responses are illustrated by the amnesty programme launched in 2009, 
the creation of the Niger Delta Ministry at the federal level, and the approval 
of increased derivation percentage in the sharing of federal revenue. These 
are the government’s declared goals, not necessarily its accomplishments. 
What is generally missing, or at least de-emphasised by both government 
and the oil communities, is a deliberate ecological response. The neoliberal 
logic that drives governance and resource extraction in the region is fixated 
primarily on maximisation of profits. The ecological issue threatens this 
goal, as it demands investment in cleaner technology and requires more 
effective and expensive clean-up operations as well as stronger regulation. 
Thus, it is convenient for both the state and the multinationals to pay lip 
service to the environmental issues and concentrate instead on the incorpo-
ration and/or co-optation of elements involved in the resistance. For the 
people of the Niger Delta, it appears that compensation for ecological dam-
age largely satisfies the grievances. This is also an indication of how red 
rather than green issues dominate the discourses on the Niger Delta crisis.  
The relative calm in the Niger Delta since the 2009 amnesty deal also 
illustrates the continued triumph of red over green in the region’s struggle 
against the powerful coalition of the state and oil multinationals. Even 
though little has changed with regard to the environmental crisis in the re-
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gion, many of the militant groups have been successfully co-opted by the 
state and now act as protectors of oil infrastructure (The Nation 2012: 19). 
This new type of cooperation between the state and former militants justi-
fies concerns about the resistance and the way environmental rhetoric has 
been mobilised to serve not-so-green ends.  
Conclusion: Reframing the  
Environmental Discourse 
What the analysis demonstrates is the continued primacy of perceptions of 
exclusion in the nature and character of resistance in the Niger Delta. Even 
though environmental rhetoric was key to the internationalisation of the 
crisis, environmental issues are, in reality, peripheral to the agitations of 
Niger Delta social movements for justice.  
The environmental movement requires a major overhauling if it is to re-
establish ecological issues as central to the Niger Delta crisis. There is of 
course little sense in suggesting that the economic and governance issues are 
not important or that they should be de-emphasised. However, the environ-
mental crisis in the Niger Delta has immense implications for global biodiver-
sity and thus deserves to be treated on its own merit rather than only to the 
extent that it relates to economic, democratic or social issues. The key to ac-
complishing this is perhaps to encourage grass-roots movements in the region 
to play a greater role in shaping the discourses about the environment. This 
will surely prove a difficult task, as oil-producing communities cannot be ex-
pected to be focused on the environment if their own economic opportunities 
are limited. However, it is a task worth embarking on.  
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„Grün“ oder „Rot“? Zur Themenverschiebung  
im nigerianischen umweltpolitischen Diskurs 
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Bedeutung umweltpoli-
tischer Bewegungen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NRO) für den 
Kampf um Demokratie in Nigeria. Insbesondere widmet er sich der Frage, 
inwiefern Umweltthemen, speziell im ölreichen Nigerdelta, inzwischen das 
große Bedürfnis der Bevölkerung reflektieren, stärker in den politischen 
Prozess einbezogen zu werden. Umweltkrisen haben den demokratischen 
Diskurs in Nigeria ganz besonders vorangebracht, weil sie zu den Grund-
lagen der ökonomischen Produktion in Beziehung stehen. Indem soziale 
Bewegungen und NRO die Umweltkrisen mit dem Demokratiedefizit und 
den Machtstrukturen innerhalb Nigerias in Beziehung setzten, fanden sie 
auch Unterstützung in Umweltfragen. Dies könnte allerdings negative Folgen 
für die nigerianische Umweltbewegung haben. Denn das zentrale Thema eines 
sozialen Diskurses zum Abbau von Ressourcen ist die Eigentumsfrage und 
nicht notwendigerweise die Nachhaltigkeit; wird der Diskurs von sozialen 
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Bewegungen bestimmt, wird die einzigartige umweltpolitische Relevanz 
möglicherweise nicht ausreichend herausgestellt. Der Autor plädiert für eine 
alternative Themensetzung im umweltpolitischen Diskurs in Entwicklungs-
ländern wie Nigeria. 
Schlagwörter: Nigeria, Politische Vereinigung/Politische Gruppierung, Öko-
logische Bewegung 
